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Executive Summary
The Ethiopian Communications Sector has seen substantial growth off a very low base over the last 
five years as a result of a massive investment through a vendor financing loan agreement with 
China's Zhongxing Telecom Corporation (ZTE) worth US$1.9 billion. The increase in access network, 
completion of core network, introduction of fixed and mobile broadband access, rolling out of fibre 
backbone and establishment of links to about 10,000 rural villages was marked by a dramatic fall in 
the quality of service. Telecommunications revenue has grown only moderately in comparison to 
investment, at around 16% per annum. The contribution of the communications sector to the 
economy remained just under 2% – low in comparison to the regional average, which is around 4%.
There has been no positive movement towards competition over the last two decades. The market 
remains structured around a monopoly where a single operator provides fixed, mobile, and Internet 
services and maintains the international gateway service. The regulator, the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Agency, remains weak in terms of its legitimacy in monitoring the behaviour 
of the monopoly operator and and its ability to deal with regulatory challenges such as licensing, 
frequency assignment and monitoring, setting and enforcing tariffs, dispute resolution, maintaining 
quality of service and promoting universal access. It is unable to attract and retain skilled 
employees with legal, regulatory, management and technical skills, due partly to low public sector 
remuneration and the absence of such skills.
The Annual Revenue Per User (ARPU) of the fixed, mobile and Internet segments plummeted over 
the last five years, resulting in an overall decline in revenue of the incumbent and government tax 
in comparison to investment. The public sector is the loser by holding on to the inefficient and 
vertically integrated monopoly market structure. ETC’s revenue stands at around US$460 million in 
2009. A fourfold increase in traffic would have brought the revenue to around US$2 billion a year, 
which could have generated about US$0.5 billion in public tax and related revenue a year, not to 
mention the productivity improvement of an enhanced ICT sector.
Ethiopia’s ICT sector remains far behind the rest of the world. It sits at the bottom of the Information 
Development Index (IDI) of the International Telecommunications Union, scoring 0.97 and placing 
154th out of 159 countries in 2010. Fixed-line teledensity stands at 1.14%, although the number of 
mobile subscribers doubled in 2009, when mobile tele-density jumped from 2.5% to 5.5%. This 
growth is paltry, however, when compared to the global average for mobile subscription of 67% in 
2009. 
The sector faces a significant skilled human-resource shortage for planning, implementation and 
management of a modern Next Generation Network and its regulation. The absence of technical, 
analytical, policy and regulatory capacity at all levels has been the major challenge in stirring the 
communication sector out of its low level development. Pro-competitive policy intervention is 
important to deal with current poor service penetration, low quality of service and high cost of 
broadband access.
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Social and Economic Overview
Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa, and it is bordered on the north and northeast by Eritrea, on 
the east by Djibouti and Somalia, on the south by Kenya, and on the west and southwest by Sudan. 
It sits in one of the most volatile regions in the African continent, neighbouring lawless Somalia and 
the Sudan, which is reeling from a long standing conflict in the south and in Darfur. Eritrea and 
Ethiopia were at war between May 1998 and June 2000. The volatility of the region is one of the 
major factors that have contributed to the governments’ heavy handed regulation of the ICT sector. 
Ethiopia and Eritrea are the last countries in the world where government owns the entire 
communications sector.
Ethiopia’s economy is mainly agrarian and subsistence. Agriculture accounts for nearly half the 
country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 60% of its exports and 80% of total employment. The 
major agricultural export crop is coffee. Other traditional major agricultural exports are leather, 
hides and skins, pulses, oilseeds, and "khat," a leafy shrub that has psychotropic qualities when 
chewed1 . Khat is mainly exported to neighbouring countries – Djibouti, Yemen and Somalia. Sugar 
and gold production has also become important in recent years along with flowers. While the 
contribution of the service sector to the economy has been growing (comprising about 41%) the 
impact of its ICT sector remained relatively small – the ICT sector contributes less than 2% to the 
economy.2
The challenges facing Ethiopia are daunting. The dynamics of population growth, very low 
productivity, inadequate educational and work standards, structural bottlenecks, dependence on 
unreliable rainfall, and being land-locked combine to pose challenges almost incomparable with 
anywhere in the world. While the Ethiopian economy has been growing over the recent year, the 
quality of life has generally been declining, especially in the rural areas. Inflationary pressures are 
growing with an average rate of 36% (2008-2009). Coupled with the substantial devaluation of the 
Ethiopian Birr, which lost its value by over 50% within a year, the inflation of food prices has had a 
direct impact on a vast majority of the people, who could otherwise have spent part of their 
earnings on communications. Increasing food prices will have a substantial impact on the ability of 
the majority of Ethiopians to afford basic communications and will negatively impact Annual 
Revenue Per User (ARPU).
Table 1. Ethiopia Economic Data
Source: World Bank, Economics Intelligence Unit, UNDP Human Development Index
Socio Economic Data
Gross Domestic Product $26.6 billion (2007-2008)
GDP Per Capita (PPP) $800 (2008)
Average inflation rate 36% (2008-2009)




Services: 41.2% (2008 estimates)
Urbanisation 17.6%
Literacy rate 15 years and above 35.9% (2007)
Human Development Index 0.414 (2009)
Inflation rate 25.3% (2008)
36.4% (2009)
Rural Ethiopia, where 82% of the population lives, is exceptionally poor. Urban poverty is growing in 
pockets of cities and towns. Ethiopia ranked 171 out of 182 countries in 2009 with a Human 
Development Index of 0.414, one of the lowest in the world. About a third of the population (31 
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1 US State Department, Country Profile, Ethiopia, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2859.htm
2 World Bank, Ethiopia at a Glance, http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/eth_aag.pdf
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million people in 2006) live on less than half a dollar a day and between 6 and 13 million people are 
at risk of starvation each year.3
Notwithstanding inflation and the growing gap between rich and poor, the last five years have 
seen impressive economic growth rates, averaging above 10%. Ethiopia’s GDP grew by 10.1 percent 
during 2009. The Economist predicts that Ethiopia will be the fifth fastest growing economy in 2010 
after Qatar, China, Congo and Turkmenistan.4  This is expected to increase the demand for 
communications and information technologies which in turn has the potential to create a virtuous 
cycle for further economic growth. However, Ethiopia’s ICT sector development will continue to 
depend on government policy choices – whether to allow for further competition in the sector or 
to hold on to an inefficient monopoly incumbent.
Political Overview
Ethiopia is a federal republic under its 1994 constitution. The executive branch includes a president, 
Council of State, and Council of Ministers. Executive power resides with the prime minister; 
therefore decisions with regards to the communications sector come from him. 
Ethiopia promotes a policy of ethnic federalism, devolving significant powers to regional, ethnically 
based authorities. The country has nine ethnically-based semi-autonomous administrative regions 
and two special city administrations (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa), which have the power to raise 
their own revenues. Considerable administrative power is devolved to the regions and down to the 
district level. The communication sector is regarded as a national strategic asset, therefore planning 
of the telecom sector has little input from these regions and districts. 
A fourth election was held in May 2010 in which the Ethiopian People Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
won with a landslide victory. The new government has introduced a new five year Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP) that is expected to boost economic growth and attain around 15% 
growth on an annual basis. It is widely expected that the newly elected government will continue 
to liberalise the country’s economy, attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), initiate privatisation 
programmes and encourage private sector’s participation in the communications market to 
facilitate the implementation of the GTP.
ICT Policies
ICT has become an integral part of Ethiopia’s development programmes over the last decade, 
following initial indifference to the development of the sector. The country faces a substantial gap 
between interest in the ICTs and the policy and regulatory instruments available to enable its 
development. ICT is one of the major components of the Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Reduction Program (SDPRP) of the Ethiopian government. The most consolidated and recent policy 
framework is the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) that 
runs between 2005 and 2010. Five major initiatives were designed with regard to the ICT sector 
development in the PASDEP document:5 
• promoting human resource development in the ICT field; 
• mainstreaming the use of ICT in all sectors of the economy, in the administration of 
government, and in the education system;
• developing the necessary telecommunications infrastructure;
• promoting research and development through ICT; and 
• creating enabling legal and regulatory framework. 
The broad ICT sector policy of the Ethiopian government that derives from PASDEP, was developed 
in 2006 by the Ethiopian ICT Development Agency (EICTDA).6  The policy aims to:
• develop ICT as a globally competitive industry, and as an engine of national growth;
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3 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Index, 2009
4 http://media.economist.com/world/
5 Government of Ethiopia, Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty, 2004 
6 Government of the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic, ICT Policy, http://www.eictda.gov.et/Downloads/
Policies/ICT_Policy_English.pdf
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• create the necessary conditions for the rapid development of ICT within the economy and 
society to accelerate Ethiopia’s socio-economic development process;
• promote and facilitate an extensive use of ICT in support of key sectors of the economy 
including agriculture, industry and the services sectors;
• transform Ethiopia into a knowledge and information-based society and economy; and
• promote the use of ICT for modernising the civil and public service to enhance its efficiency 
and effectiveness for service delivery, to promote good governance and reduce wastage of 
scarce resources. 
To achieve the above objectives, the government has crafted various programmes that aim at:
• creating an enabling policy, regulatory and legal environment for the growth and utilisation 
of ICTs;
• developing the necessary ICT human resources, infrastructure, rural access, ICT standards, 
and local content;
• strengthening the capacity of public institutions to facilitate the mainstreaming of ICTs for 
socioeconomic development; and
• facilitating the use of appropriate technologies for development of applications and 
content for rural development, good governance, and service delivery in priority sectors.
While these policy objectives are laudable, a critical standpoint shows a conflict between 
government policy objectives for improving affordable access to ICTs to individuals, households, 
businesses and institutions and the regulatory and policy instruments available to enable it. 
Ethiopia is one of the few countries that has retained a government monopoly over its fixed, 
Internet and the mobile markets. The monopoly market structure is one of the major factors in the 
slow development of its ICT sector. Table 2 lists the prevailing policy in the communication sector.






Monopoly ETC is the sole provider of international and 
domestic fixed-line services.
Mobile service Monopoly ETC is the sole provider of mobile service
International gateway Monopoly ETC controls the international gateway
Internet services Monopoly ETC is the sole provider of Internet service 
Domain names Monopoly ETC is the manager of the domain name and 
responsible for web hosting under “.et” domain. 




Individuals and enterprises are not allowed to own 
VSATs and bypass the national gateway. 
International organisations are allowed to own 
VSAT with payment of traffic compensation or 
“landing right” fees on case-by-case basis. 
Call centre, cyber café 
and messaging services Competition
Downstream value-added services such as call 
centres, pay phones, cyber cafés and messaging 
services are allowed for competition. 




Call back or use of modern technology like VOIP 
are not allowed. 
Telecommunications 
equipment
Competition Sale of mobile and telephone handsets is allowed. 
Source: ETC Strategy paper 2004-2006, Council of Ministers Regulation No. 10/1996, Proclamation No. 49/1996; 
Proclamation No. 116/1998 and Council of Ministers Regulation 47/1999
In summation, the sector is characterised by an incongruence between the broad policy objective 
of increasing access and the instruments the government uses to achieve that. Although the public 
monopoly is often regarded as an instrument for expanding the core network due to the capital 
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investments and economy of scale that makes a single provider more effective, analysis below 
shows that Ethiopia’s adherence to a natural monopoly has been detrimental to the development 
of its ICT sector.
ICT Sector Regulation
The reform process in the telecommunication sector began in 1996 with the adoption of a 
proclamation that provides for the regulation of telecommunications services (49/1996)7  (as 
amended), in which the government created the regulator, the Ethiopian Telecommunications 
Agency (ETA). The regulator was legally established in November 1996, but it was not operational 
until December 1997 when the General Manager was appointed by the Minister of Transport and 
Communications.8  The establishment of the regulator as a viable institution with adequate and 
skilled staff took another two years. This was followed by a change in the ETA management in 2001, 
with two acting general managers over the period of a year until a general manager was formally 
appointed in 2002. The last general manager left the country in 2009 and no further formal 
appointment was made until March 2010. 
Table 3. Legislation Relevant to the Communication Sector
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency, Ethiopian Broadcasting Agency
Year Legislation/Regulation
2007 Proclamation No. 533/2007 – Broadcast Service Proclamation – http://www.eba.gov.et/
wed/data/LawsRegs/main.html
2006 Council of Ministers Regulation No. 130/2006 - Information Network Security Agency 
Establishment Council of Ministers Regulation
2004 Council of Minister’s Regulation No. 99/2004
2003 Proclamation No. 360/2003 – Ethiopian Information and Communication Technology 
Development Agency Establishment Proclamation
2003 Proclamation No. 375/2003, Investment (amendment) Proclamation)
2003 Council of Ministers Regulation No. 93/2003
2002 Proclamation No. 280/2002
2002 Proclamation No. 281/2002
1999 Proclamation No. 178/1999 – Ethiopian Broadcasting Agency Establishment 
Proclamation
1999 Broadcasting proclamation N°187 – http://www.telecom.net.et/~eta/
Important_legs.htm
1998 Investment proclamation No 166/1998
1996 Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency Proclamation 49/1996 – http://
www.telecom.net.et/~eta/Proc_No_49_1996.htm
1996 Proclamation for the establishment of Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation 
10/1996
1996 Regulation to provide for the regulation of telecommunication services
Besides its lack of a manager, the ETA has no independent board of directors or commissioners. The 
minister, who allocates its budget, appoints the general manager. Moreover, the Council of 
Ministers’ regulation on Telecommunications Services that was issued in 1999 (proclamation 
47/1999)9  gives the Ministry of Transport and Communications the power to issue directives 
without recourse to the regulator or the public. Without distinction on whether the directives are of 
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7 Federal Democratic Ethiopia, Proclamation 49/1966, http://www.eta.gov.et/Button/Scan/Telecom%20Proc
%2049_1996%20NG1.pdf
8 Mbendi, Ethiopia - Computers & Communications: Communications Industry Regulation, http://
www.mbendi.com/indy/cotl/govc/af/et/p0005.htm
9 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Council of Ministers Telecommunications Service Regulation, http://
www.eta.gov.et/Button/Scan/Telecom%20Regulation%2047_1999%20NG.pdf
Although public 
monopoly is often 
regarded as an 
instrument for 
expanding the core 
network, Ethiopia’s 
adherence to the 
inefficient incumbent 
has been detrimental 
to sector growth.
policy or operational nature, the Ministry can direct the sector without involving the ETA if it deems 
that is necessary. Effectively, the ETA acts as a department within the ministry rather than as an 
independent regulator that guides the ICT sector in the country. 
The regulations that established the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation and the Ethiopian 
Telecommunications Agency have not been updated in over a decade. No new regulations and 
guidelines were issued by the regulator over the last three years, an indication of the stalled 
communication sector regulatory process in Ethiopia. The major regulatory instruments that 
govern the ICT market in Ethiopia are listed in Table 3.
Institutional Arrangements
The overall communication sector governance framework in Ethiopia comprises a number of 
players that influence the regulatory environment in different ways, but the key power rests with 
the prime minister. The main actors include:
• The Prime Minister, head of the government and ultimately responsible for decisions on 
policy and regulatory matters. 
• The Council of Ministers, which approves communications regulations and sets the budget 
of the ETA.
• The Ministry of Transport and Communications, which defines the policy framework, directs 
the regulator and oversees the activities of the incumbent operator. The Ministry appoints 
the General Manager of the ETA and the Chief Executive Officer of the ETC.
• The Ministry of Capacity Building, which defines ICT strategy for the public service, 
including education, health, agriculture and other sectors. The Ministry hosts the EICTDA, 
which is responsible for the development and implementation of the national ICT policy. 
• The Government Communication Office, which deals with broadcasting sector and 
oversees the activities of the Ethiopian Broadcasting Agency, which has a parallel function 
to the Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency.
• An ETC Board of Directors, which supervises the Ethiopian Telecommunications 
Corporation. The Board develops the telecommunications strategy for the country and 
appoints senior managers to the ETC. 
The three institutions that compete for the regulation of the ICT sector are the EICTDA, ETA and 
EBA. The ETA and EICTDA have areas of ICT regulation that often overlap, such as community 
access, content and legislations pertaining to online transactional content. The EBA and ETA overlap 
in the area of spectrum management and regulation of converged content.
The EICTDA was established to promote the use of ICTs in government agencies, education and in 
the private sector. It deals with five themes: ICT for government; legal and regulatory frameworks 
including standards; human resources development; ICT applications in sector; private sector 
development and promotion of community access. The EICTDA has also been charged with the 
review of a national ICT policy.
The EBA was established in 2000 following a proclamation for its establishment in 1999. It has not 
been effective for quite a long period due to a protracted debate over opening the broadcasting 
sector for private investment. The EBA works closely with the Ethiopian Telecommunications 
Agency and responsible for the management of the broadcast radio frequency spectrum.
Despite its collaboration with other agencies, the ETA remains the weakest institution compared to 
the EBA and EICTDA. The public monopoly of telecommunication services leaves the ETA with little 
to regulate. So far, the focus of the regulator has been confined to the collection of licensing fees 
from small scale service providers such as telephone service resellers, cyber cafés, and importers of 
communications equipment that were authorised under Proclamation No. 281/2002.10  
Efforts to improve ETA’s capacity began in 2008 through a Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) 
process, and new legislation was drafted in 2008 that permits it to cover the telecommunications 
and postal sectors. But the draft legislation did not go through the Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers, therefore undermining the legitimacy of the regulator.
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The legitimacy of the regulator is central to the development of the communications sector in 
Ethiopia. An effective and legitimate regulatory body cannot be attained without competition; and 
competition cannot be achieved without good regulatory institution. Having a legitimate and 
skilled regulator prior to opening up the sector could improve investor confidence, which will likely 
increase Foreign Direct investment and encourage better diffusion of the ICT services.
Licensing of the telecommunications sector
Licensing in telecommunications consists of the ETC receiving a monopoly licence from the 
regulator to provide fixed, mobile and Internet services on an exclusive basis in exchange for 
efficiency and quality of service requirements and infrastructure expansion targets. The network 
rollout targets are set by the ETC itself and approved by its Board of Directors, often with little input 
from the regulator. 
In 2007, the ETC entered in a strategic agreement with China's Zhongxing Telecom Corporation 
(ZTE) through a vendor-financing soft-loan agreement amounting to US$1.9 billion to substantially 
expand its infrastructure. The vendor-financing scheme was subsequently used as the basis of the 
ETC’s 2007–2010 targets. The targets pledge to achieve the following by 2010:
• roll out a 10,0000km optical fiber transmission network; 
• increase the number of fixed lines in operation by 2010 to 4.4 million, thus raising tele-
density to 6%;
• expand the mobile subscriber base to 10,000,000 with 85% national geographic coverage 
of mobile signal;
• attain 1,000,000 Internet subscribers, thus raising Internet subscribers density from 0.02% to 
0.23%;
• expand 3G services to rural areas, in particular to major towns out of Addis Ababa;
• install wireless and VSAT connections to 15,000 villages including installation of CDMA 
Wireless Local Loop;
• expand the CDMA network with a capacity of 2.5 million subscribers,
• install 50,000 public telephones all over the country;
• establish a Network Operation Centre;
• establish a state-of-the art call centre; and
• establish a modern customer care and billing system.
It was also envisaged that all district towns would benefit from digital communications systems, 
and all major roads of the country, town centres, tourist centres, historical places and industrial 
villages will have mobile signals following the completion of the much awaited ZTE/ETC project. 
Progress so far indicates that the core network is being completed and about two-thirds of the fibre 
network has been rolled out. Targets such as reaching 10,000,000 mobile subscribers and 15,000 
villages are not likely to be met by 2010 as planned. Besides, the incumbent will not have the 
resources to continue building or maintaining its infrastructure to catch up with the growing 
demand for services in the rest of the world. 
By the end of 2009 there were 4,051,703 mobile subscribers (less than half of what has been 
pledged in the strategic plan) and 915,058 fixed-line subscribers, giving a total subscriber base of 
4,966,761 covering about 6% of the population. Mobile teledensity stands at around 5.5% – a low 
figure compared to penetration rates around the world. Some countries in Africa, such as Botswana 
and South Africa, have sold more SIM cards than their total population, and neighbouring countries 
like Kenya and Sudan have achieved rates as high as ten times that of Ethiopia.11  Table 4 shows a 
comparison between stated targets for 2007–2010 and actual progress made by 2009, just a year 
before the target.
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data in most countries is generally inflated by 20% to 50%. More SIM cards are sold than those actually in use at 
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Table 4. ETC Targets for 2010 and Performance by end of 2009
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation – Statistical Bulletin 2008/2009 
Targets Target by June 2010 Achievement by end 
of 2009
Achievement in % 
by June 2009
Fixed network 3,000,000 1,150,622 38%
Mobile subscription 12,000,000 4,051,703 40.5%
Fibre network (km) 10,000 6,332 63.3%
Internet subscription 150,000 71,059 43.4%
Reach out to rural 
villages
15,000 9,892 67%
It is evident that the incumbent operator will not be able to meet the self-imposed targets, in 
particular in the area of mobile and Internet subscription, where it was about 60% off the target in 
2009. Although two-thirds of the fibre network and rural village access had been accomplished by 
end of 2009, it is unlikely these will be fully attained by 2010. The major problems cited by the ETC 
include difficulties in securing the right of way, vandalism on its fibre network, inadequate supply of 
the electric power and difficulties with the civil works.
Market Structure
Ethiopia’s public monopoly of the communication sector and a vertically integrated market 
structure determine access to and use of ICT in the country. The market is characterised by 
excessive pricing, especially in the broadband and international direct dialling segment, poor 
quality of service, inefficiency, lock-in, and the absence of choice that had a detrimental effect on 
the revenue of the incumbent and the productivity of public and private enterprises. 
Despite pressures from international financial institutions, Ethiopia’s telecommunications market 
structure has continued to be state-owned. Close observation also shows that it is unlikely that 
liberalisation will take place in the short term. Telecommunications is viewed as a strategic asset for 
the economy and national security in the horn of Africa. Another obvious reason why the 
government would like to hold on to the state-owned enterprise is its interest in recouping the 
massive investment it made in recent years and repay the US$1.5 billion loan. The government has 
sunk so much borrowed capital into the network that it is highly risk-averse and therefore likely to 
maintain the status quo. 
Senior policy makers have been cautious when it comes to the introduction of competition to the 
communications sector or privatisation of the incumbent. The main line of argument so far has 
been that “liberalisation will not result in positive universal access to the poor people due to the 
profit motives of the multinational companies that are interested in the cream telecom market.” The 
“cream skimming” or “cherry picking” argument was repeated several times by policy makers, who 
argued that the new entrant will focus on corporate customers and urban areas and take away 
business from the incumbent. The related argument, which held an appeal to most people, was 
that the monopoly incumbent is the only option for meeting universal service objectives in 
Ethiopia since access requires massive investment and cross-subsidies. 
It was further argued that telecommunications infrastructure is a public good and that government 
is best placed to promote universal access12. ETC feels that it has the obligation to deploy the 
communication networks to rural areas as per the government decentralisation programme. Other 
factors, such as employment and labour disputes, are also taken into account. While the universal 
services arguments may have some merit – particularly with regard to the government’s role in 
rolling out broadband infrastructure that underpins Ethiopia’s future economic growth – the status 
quo has been detrimental to the growth of the ICT sector in Ethiopia.
Global progress in competition and privatisation of the communication sector shows that most of 
the arguments above offer a superficial and flawed appeal to public interest agendas and to those 
who do not have an understanding of the linkage between policy, regulation and sector 
performance. Monopoly undermines government revenues and the competitiveness of 
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enterprises. Estimates show that the ETC loses about 30% of its revenues to bad quality of service 
on an annual basis.
Comparative analysis of countries shows that the Ethiopian government, by holding on to a 
vertically integrated monopoly market structure, is actually the loser. Telecom sector development 
in countries that have liberalised the sector, like Kenya and Uganda, shows that the Ethiopian 
government loses tax revenues of at least US$0.5 billion per year by not opening its 
communication sector for investment – not to mention the impact that wider and more 
competitive access could have brought to the economy and competitiveness of enterprises. ETC 
revenue stands at around US$460 million in 2009. A four-fold increase in traffic would have brought 
the revenue to around US$2 billion a year, which would have generated about US$0.5 billion in 
public tax and related revenue a year, in addition to the impact that wider access would have on 
enterprises and individuals.
The stance on monopoly has also been delaying Ethiopia’s global and regional integration. Ethiopia 
is poorly integrated into the regional and international economy and it has not been able to reap 
the benefits, despite being the host of African institutions such as the African Union Commission 
and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). For example, Ethiopia was able to use its strategic 
position to run one of the most successful airlines in Africa, but it was unable to develop a 
communications sector of a global standard. The lack of institutional capacity and the low level of 
awareness of the linkage between policy, regulation and operation of the communications sector, 
in particular the inability to understand the technological development in the sector, have been 
major obstacles to the integration process.
The government applied for membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2003 and 
committed to preparing itself thoroughly for the accession negotiations. In order to accede to the 
WTO, it needs to participate in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and negotiate a 
schedule of specific commitments on trade in services, including telecom and financial services, 
transport, tourism and others. As a part of its integration strategy, Ethiopia has prepared a 
Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime, which was the first prerequisite to negotiate accession 
in the WTO in 2007. The Working Party on the Accession of Ethiopia held its first meeting in May 
2008 to examine Ethiopia’s foreign trade regime. However, despite the original target accession 
date for 2009, Ethiopia was unable to accede to the WTO, mainly due to its fear of vulnerability to an 
account deficit when it opens up its market and its stance on delaying the liberalisation of the 
banking and the telecom sectors.
Nevertheless, policy makers are becoming wary of the inefficiency of the incumbent operator, 
especially the low revenue collection from subscribers. The government was unable to 
acknowledge that ETC’s inefficiency is actually the result of its own policy on the communication 
sector. Instead it started to look for a solution elsewhere, by appointing a management firm that 
offers efficiency and effectiveness on a revenue-sharing basis. 
The six-month search for a strategic partner in 2010 led to the selection of France Telecom to run 
the ETC on a revenue sharing basis. The other competing bidders were Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd 
(VNSL) and MTN Group. 
This follows an attempt in 2002 to appoint a strategic investor that could generate fresh capital and 
transfer technical expertise, implementation experience and management skills. The possibility of 
selling part of the ETC shares to private partners was also explored in 2002 by engaging a 
consulting firm, Price Waterhouse Coopers, which undertook audits of ETC assets in the same year. 
However, the selling-off of shares was shelved in 2003 due to various reasons including “lack of 
interest from investors”,13  uncertainties about strategic partnership, and the government’s 
apprehension about the impact of telecommunications liberalisation on the economy, not least on 
the strategic importance of communications to power. Afterwards, the government resorted to 
overhauling the management of the ETC and adopted a “wait and see” mode rather than pursuing 
the originally planned strategic partnership route. 
The main tool against the ineffectiveness of the ETC so far was to change the management and see 
if that could lead to an efficient state-owned enterprise. This “tool” faltered in 2006, resulting in three 
major management reshuffles in the incumbent. Critics argued that the change of senior 
management would not change the fundamental structural problem of the public monopoly – its 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness. 
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While the government is still negotiating the terms of the management takeover by France 
Telecom in its second attempt to improve efficiency through change in management, critics argue 
that the inflated, unskilled and unproductive workforce and other structural challenges will make it 
difficult for the incumbent to become efficient. The structural challenges to Ethiopia’s 
communications sector run far deeper than inefficient management. The major structural 
challenges are:
• a lack of adequate staff skilled in management of internetworking and Next Generation 
Networks;
• a low-level work attitude and entrepreneurship arising from entrenched civil service culture; 
and
• low quality service that has a direct impact on the revenue of the incumbent.
Other structural challenges include the absence of advanced and cutting-edge policy and 
managerial capacity at government decision-making levels, lack of state-of-the-art technical skills, 
inadequate corporate work attitude and quality of service, and above all a lack of financial muscle 
to sustain the building of the Next Generation Networks. Moreover, there are factors beyond the 
control of the incumbent, including systemic problems including red tape, absence of contracts for 
civil works and the level of cooperation from other public and private institutions. In sum, the main 
ingredients of a competitive firm are currently absent and they are unlikely to be built overnight, 
thereby stifling the attempts to improve productivity of the incumbent by engaging a foreign firm 
to manage it. 
Despite some progress in rolling out fibre infrastructure and introducing a broadband mobile 
network, Ethiopia’s ICT sector remains far behind the rest of the world. Ethiopia sits near the bottom 
of the ITU Information Development Index (IDI), scoring 0.97, placing it 154th out of 159 countries.14  
Until March 2010, when it signed an agreement with SEACOM to purchase 3 Gbps, Ethiopia was not 
able to capitalise on the momentum in the rest of Africa in achieving affordable broadband 
connectivity following the landing of submarine cables in its neighbouring countries. The slow 
pace of the development of the communication infrastructure has continued to deter social and 
economic progress and constrain the competitiveness of institutions, enterprises and individuals. A 
policy measure that introduces gradual competition with a long-term strategy that brings 
affordable broadband connectivity to institutions and enterprises is critical for Ethiopia to achieve 
its goal of becoming a middle-income country by 2020.
Universal Access
Ethiopia does not have a universal access fund to expand communications to rural areas. The major 
resources for rural connectivity come from cross-subsidies between international and domestic 
tariffs, and the incumbent’s plan for expanding services to underserved areas. The ETC uses two 
instruments for achieving universal access:
• a Rural Communication Project (RCP); and
• rolling out ETC’s service stations in underserved areas
The Rural Communication Project was aimed at rolling out services to over 18,000 Kebeles (rural 
sub-counties). Kebeles (sub-counties) are the lowest government administration hubs. A typical 
rural Kebele comprises of 500 to 800 households. The Rural Communications Project was originally 
planned to cover all the 18,000 Kebele associations in two phases – 3000 in 2005 and 15,000 in 
2006 – using wireless local loop technology and VSAT. Each rural station was envisaged as having a 
PC, phone, fax and Internet access. It was estimated that each station would cost between $8,000 
and $15,000 to set up. The ETC had also planned to hire 36,000 graduates of technical and 
vocational schools to operate village communication centres that provide all ranges of 
communication services to customers.15  The number of Kebeles to be connected was revised 
downwards from 18,000 to 15,000 in 2007. 
By 2009, about two thirds (9,892) of the targeted villages were connected. While connecting 
villages will undoubtedly improve equity and universal access to communications infrastructure, it 
is not clear whether the approach to connect each Kebele makes business sense or will be 
sustainable in the long term. There has been limited study of the impact of a model parachuting 
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one link in the middle of a village without rolling out connectivity to residents or entrepreneurs that 
may seize the opportunity of the presence of the network and provide diverse services to 
community members. 
The Rural Connectivity Project was based on the conviction that the same technology works for 
everyone and that rural people wish to access similar communication services to those accessed in 
urban areas. Affordable and easy access to a telephone is often the major preoccupation of rural 
people, although advanced services like the Internet are desired. The ability to provide access to 
basic communications to people in rural areas should be the underlying drive for the universal 
access. 
The second instrument for expanding access was expanding ETC’s own telephone stations in 
underserved areas (small remote towns) using VSAT and radio. There were 994 telephone stations in 
2009, of which 565 were served using a digital automatic telephone exchange.
While the rolling out of ETC stations to rural towns and establishment of communication links to 
farmers’ associations has made a significant improvement, the regulator lacks a well thought out 
and sustainable universal access plan driven by demand and based on technological and business 
innovations and quality of service.  The Rural Connectivity Project did not take the potential of small 
players such as rural cooperatives, private sector and resellers (including women entrepreneurs) 
into account. 
Given the experience with rural farmer associations, models that are built around cooperatives and 
those that involve women could be very attractive in providing access to communications in rural 
areas. Micro-lending has shown some success and could be adapted to the provision of 
communication services. Different models of shared access facilities, such as telecentres in schools, 
libraries and clinics etc. could also be explored by the regulator and policy makers in order to 
promote access and improve employment opportunities in rural areas. 
Small towns provide a lifeline for the surrounding community. In addition to the availability of 
mobile coverage, a well functioning and cheap telephone system in small towns throughout the 
country could perhaps provide the best alternative to reach out to people in rural areas. The 
involvement of rural cooperatives and entrepreneurs in the delivery of rural communication would 
not only relieve the incumbent from managing last mile projects but also create opportunities for 
the regulator to play a key role in licensing and regulating small-scale service providers and in 
carrying out research on cost, infrastructure and technology options that stimulate further access.
Human Resources
Human capital in the computing and communications field in Ethiopia is very limited compared to 
demand, although the number of young people graduating with basic computer skills has been 
growing. There is a considerable shortage of experts that design and implement systems. A survey 
conducted by the Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission in 2005 shows out of 311 PhD 
holders in academic institutions only 22 (7%) specialise in engineering and information technology. 
In effect, the figure did not change much in 2010.
The introduction of computer science and IT degrees in seven public universities as of 2003 has 
improved student intake in the ICT sector in Ethiopia. The number of students enrolled in private 
colleges has also improved. There were 9454 students pursuing information technology in 
vocational public schools in 2006, of which 45% were male and 55% female. Students enrolled in 
ICT-related subjects represent around 13% of the total enrolment in 200616. 
The Ministry of Education’s Education Management Information Systems figures show a significant 
drop in the number of women registered for computer science and engineering at the university 
levels compared to those enrolled in vocational ICT education. The number of women in ICT-
related fields at university level represents about 15% of the total students enrolled in those 
programmes in 2006. The pipe gets thinner as students move up in the higher education ladder. 
There were 353 students enrolled for graduate degrees in computer science and electrical 
engineering in 2006, of which only 8% were women. 
The quality of IT education has been improving in recent years due to the establishment of three 
centres of excellence (Addis Ababa University, HILCOE College and Micro Link information 
Technology College) that provide education in advanced software engineering and systems 
development. However, the number of qualified and certified programmers and network managers 
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is insignificant in creating a meaningful domestic ICT industry. The absence and low level of 
attention to compliance with industry certification such as Microsoft, CISCO, Oracle etc. means that 
there are few individuals with the skills required to tap into the global ICT business. 
Addis Ababa University is the leading national university and one of the major sources of ICT 
human resources. ICT-related departments include the Department of Computer Science, the 
Department of Information Science (which grew out of a library science program) and the 
Department of Electrical Engineering. The introduction of post graduate studies in Computers 
Science and Electrical Engineering and the upgrading of the Ethiopian Telecommunications 
Training Institute to run graduate programmes were among the initiatives that improved research 
and development in the ICT sector in the country. These graduate programmers have yielded 
research in areas such as Natural Language Processing, information search and retrieval and large 
scale database management and mining that can be scaled up to meet the growing development 
challenges of the country. The budding research work in the areas of wireless networks and 
networking technologies at the Graduate School of Telecommunications and Information 
Technology is also promising, although this has been cut short due to administrative difficulties the 
school faced over the last two years. 
A PhD programme in ICT was launched in 2008 by bringing together a consortium of departments 
drawn from the Addis Ababa University and the College of Telecommunications and Information 
Technology. The PhD programme focuses on areas that were regarded as priority – software 
engineering, information systems, information retrieval and language technology and wireless 
communication systems, IP networking and mobile Internet. The programme is expected to 
generate a critical mass of researchers, educators and managers that will support growth in 
teaching, learning, research and development.
The telecommunication field is one area where Ethiopia faces a critical shortage of human 
resources. The ETC does not have a well-developed human resource plan to deal with its 
increasingly intelligent network. 
In an effort to improve the human resources base for the deployment of the new generation 
networks, the government upgraded its fifty-years old Ethiopian Telecom Training Institute to a 
graduate College of Telecommunications and Information Technology (CTIT) in 2004. The CTIT 
began postgraduate training in telecommunications engineering and telecommunication 
management and has graduated a few engineers between 2008 and 2009. In 2010, the CTIT ceased 
to accept new students, citing administrative challenges. While the fate of the college is unknown, 
industry analysis shows a mismatch between graduate curricula and modern telecommunication 
network planning, implementation and management requirements in Ethiopia. Modern 
telecommunications engineering and management requires education beyond graduate level. It 
needs exposure to new ideas and situations, hands on training and certifications, iteration and 
improvisation that cannot be achieved through graduate education alone.
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Contribution of ICT Infrastructure and Services
Contribution to Economic Growth
The low level of ICT penetration in Ethiopia corresponds to a meagre contribution to national 
economic development. Ethiopia’s Gross Domestic Product has improved significantly between 
2000 and 2009 with an annual growth rate of around 10%, while the contribution of the 
telecommunications sector changed only slightly. Telecommunications revenue was 1.3% of the 
GDP in 1996, grew to about 2.3% in 2005, and fell again to 1.3% in 2009. In contrast, the investment 
in the telecommunications sector as a percentage of the GDP has jumped substantially since 2003. 
Although the revenue and contribution of the telecom sector was expected to improve following 
the high-profile investment that began in 2005, progress so far shows that the contribution of 
communication sector to the GDP has been declining. Table 5 presents the contribution of the 
telecommunications sector to the GDP, and investment over the last eight years.
Table 5. Contribution of Telecommunication Sector to the GDP
Source: World Bank, World Bank, World Development Indicators, ETC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008/2009
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
GDP at market price 
(billions)
7.79 8.17 10.1 12.3 15.2 19.4 26.5 34
Telecommunication 
revenue in US$ billion
.104 .123 .144 .211 .280 .367 .345 .453
Telecommunication 
Revenue as % of GDP 
in market price
1.6 1.8 1.75 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.4 1.35
It is evident from Figure 1 that although ETC’s revenue has been growing over the last decade, it did 
not advance in par with real GDP growth. In effect, telecommunications revenue as a percentage of 
real GDP has declined since 2005.
Figure 1. Telecommunications Revenue as a Percentage of GDP
Source: World Bank, World Bank, World Development Indicators, ETC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008/2009
The decline of the revenue as a percentage of GDP can be attributed partly to the drop in the value 
of the Ethiopian Birr. The inability of the incumbent to improve the quality of service and develop 
innovative products that boost its Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) is mostly to blame for the 
plummeting revenue as percentage of GDP. The ETC incurs about 30% loss of revenue due to its 
low quality of service.
Contribution of the Telecommunications Sector to Employment
The ETC is one of the largest employers of the civil service with 12,384 employees in 2009. Its work 
force represents about 2.8% of close to 450,000 civil servants. The proportion of male to female 
employees remained the same, hovering around 70:30 for almost a decade, and started to decline 
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Table 6. Employment in the Telecommunications Sector
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008/2009
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Male 5416 5897 6290 7764 8087 8712 8913
Female 2497 2632 2803 3470 3557 3548 3471
Total 7913 8529 9093 11234 11644 12260 12384
% of women 32 31 31 31 31 29 28
Fixed lines 404790 494,008 610,347 725,046 888088 897,287 915,058 
Mobile lines 100000 155,534 410,630 866,709 1,208,498 1,954,527 4,051,703
Total phones 504,790 649,542 1,020,977 1,606,959 2,088,586 2,851,814 4,966,761
Total Phones/
employees
64 76 112 149 179 233 401
The proportion of telephone lines to the number of ETC employees has been growing over the last 
ten years, as is shown in Figure 2. The rapid growth in the telephone/employee ratio was mainly 
due to the fast growth in mobile subscription.
Figure 2. Proportion of Telephone to Employees
Source: Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008/2000
It is important to note that the ETC does not have disaggregated data on who is responsible for its 
fixed, mobile and Internet services; therefore it is difficult to gauge whether the corporation is 
actually efficient simply by looking at those figures. Mobile communications tend to be very 
efficient and often need a few thousand employees to run a network servicing tens of millions of 
customers. On average most mobile operators have 2000 subscribers per employee; therefore 
having 400 subscribers per employee is very far from being an efficient operator. The incumbent is 
grossly over-staffed, with 80% of the staff under-skilled to manage its increasingly intelligent Next 
Generation Network.
The actual contribution of the communication sector to employment is mainly through its spill 
over effect. The expansion of mobile phones and Internet to rural towns did not only increase the 
number of small business but created employment opportunities for secondary school and college 
graduates, particularly for women who would otherwise have had no employment opportunities. 
The employment that was created in running mobile accessories shops, cyber cafés and phone 
booths has been significant. 
The Size of the Telecommunications Market
Ethiopia is one of the countries that face limited territorial coverage of mobile and fixed services 
and lag behind the rest of Africa in terms of the introduction of state-of-the-art services such as 
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mobile banking. The communications market comprises fixed, mobile and Internet services 
segments. The wireless infrastructure comprises Broadband Fixed Wireless Access (BFWA), Global 
System for Mobile (GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) and Wideband Code Division 
Multiple Access (WCDMA). 
Ethiopia’s communications market is far behind the global average. Fixed-line teledensity stands at 
1.14%. Although the number of mobile subscribers has doubled in 2009, mobile teledensity 
jumping from 2.5% to 5% over this period, this is too low when compared to the global mobile 
subscription average, which was 67% in 2009. Figure 3 shows the size of the growth in the fixed and 
mobile communications markets.
Figure 3. Mobile and Fixed Market
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008/2009
Internet subscription has seen substantial growth between 2007 and 2009. The number of Internet 
subscribers stands at 71,059, representing about 0.09% of the population. While Internet access has 
improved, with mobile broadband and the availability of cyber cafés throughout major towns, the 
unreliability of the network has been the major setback to improved usage. It is estimated that 
about 500,000 Ethiopians (0.6% of the population) use the Internet, which is one of the lowest rates 
in the world.
Figure 4. Growth in Internet Subscribers
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Access to communication services in Ethiopia is characterised by a high pent-up demand. The 
registered waiting list for fixed-line communication was 13,579 in 2007 and increased by a third to 
19,013 in 2008, although this was dropped to 18,548 in 2009,17  possibly as people substituted 
mobile for unavailable fixed services. The waiting list for mobile services is also extensive, with over 
a quarter of the population of 80 million (20 million users) waiting for their first mobile SIM cards. 
Figure 5. Waiting List for Fixed Line
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008/2009
Figure 6 shows that although the ETC began attending to the waiting list as of 2005, it was unable 
to eliminate the number of subscribers that are still waiting for their first fixed phones. In effect, the 
number of those waiting for fixed phones has been growing since 2007.
Comparative analysis of the communications market in Ethiopia with neighbouring countries like 
Kenya and Sudan shows that Ethiopia lags far  behind its neighbours and is unlikely to catch up 
with the rest of the world unless it develops competitive policies that stimulate sector growth.
Table 7. Communications Market Gap between Ethiopia and Neighbouring Countries
Ethiopia Kenya Sudan
Mobile (2008) 3% 39% 30%




Driver of Universal Access Incumbent CCK NTC
Regulator Partially independent Fully independent Partially independent
Financial Analysis
Ethiopia’s investment in the telecommunication sector has seen a substantial rise since 2002. 
Capital investment jumped from US$29.1 million in 2002 to US$128 million in 2003. The capital 
budget doubled in 2004 to US$300 million and rose to about US$500 million in 2005. In 2005, the 
government realized that it would not be able to meet the US$500 million investment per year. To 
continue such an infrastructure rollout, the ETC issued a request for proposals for a soft loan in 
mid-2006. Following interest from China, the government entered into a vendor financing loan 
agreement with China's Zhongxing Telecom Corporation (ZTE) at the end of 2006. 
Critics of the vendor financing loan argue that the scheme could bind Ethiopia to a few vendors, 
undercutting innovation and choice. Those in favor of the vendor financing scheme argue that it 
brought urgently needed finance and could help the government to fast-track the rolling out of 
infrastructure, since the vendors will not be bound by traditional public sector procurement 
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regulations. Others contend that the loan could tie the Ethiopian telecommunication services to 
Chinese firms, who will continue to dictate the level of the infrastructure and the quality of service. 
Observers also contend that the ETC will not have any choice but to continue to borrow more from 
the Chinese banks to maintain its massive network in the coming years. Table 8 summarises some 
of the arguments for and against the vendor financing loan scheme.
Table 8. Argument for and against vendor financed loan
Source: Personal Communication 2009
Argument in favour of vendor 
financing loan
Arguments in opposition to vendor financing loan
Government will have access to 
quick and relatively cheap 
investment to roll out massive 
infrastructure.
Vendor financing will increase the cost of networking due to 
lock-in effect.
Government should not have entered into a loan agreement 
to roll out infrastructure that could have been achieved 
through private sector investment.
Private sector would have brought the much needed network 
rollout technical expertise, quality of service and government 
tax as evidenced in neighbouring countries. 
The government would have been an income earner rather 
than a borrower.
ETC will have access to technical 
expertise in a relatively short 
period of time.
The scheme will lock ETC into a single vendor over a long 
term, and will therefore be locked into specific vendor 
equipment. The language differences and absence of 
expertise in NGN on the ground would make it difficult for 
transfer of technical expertise by ZTE.
The scheme will allow the ETC to 
maintain control of the network 
and facilitates the rolling out of 
infrastructure in rural areas.
The ETC could have achieved same through strategic 
partnership with a foreign company. In effect, the ETC is 
currently trying to achieve that by engaging France Telecom. 
The rolling out of infrastructure by ZTE will make it harder to 
attract a strategic partner that could bring technical and 
management expertise.
The vendor financing scheme 
could improve efficiency of 
network capacity 
since vendors will not be bound 
by traditional bureaucracy.
The scheme should have to pass through routine ETC 
procedures, therefore it is unlikely for it to achieve a desired 
result within the planned time frame. 
While the loan was hailed at the beginning as a knight in shining armour, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that the inherent inefficiency of a monopoly service provider will make it difficult 
for the government to generate the requisite revenue to pay the loan back and sustain network 
maintenance and operation at the same time. The Annual Revenue Per User and the Quality of 
Service has been declining in recent years, making it difficult for the ETC to generate enough cash 
to sustain the rollout of its Next Generation Network.
Table 9. Mobile Annual Revenue Per User in Birr
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2008/2009








155,534 410,630 866,700 1,208,498 1,954,527 4,051,703 
ARPU in Birr 1667 1249 1148 1295 803 663
Mobile operation is one area where the incumbent’s revenue base is increasing. However, a careful 
analysis shows that the Annual Revenue Per User is plummeting so fast that the ETC is not 
benefiting from its increasing mobile subscriber base. The Annual Revenue Per User has declined by 
50% between 2007 and 2009 and 17% between 2008 and 2009.
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The situation gets worse when mobile ARPU is translated into US$. Figure 6 shows the annual 
Revenue Per User in US$ between 2004 and 2009. The Mobile ARPU for 2009 stands at US$50 which 
translates to US$4 per month – almost a half of the lowest ARPU of US$7 per month in most 
countries in Africa.
Figure 6. Mobile ARPU in US$
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2008/2009
The absence of innovations around mobile offering and the low quality of service are some of the 
major reasons for the decline in the ARPU. Few amongst the public are aware of the voicemail or 
call-waiting services. Text messaging (SMS) is not widely used in Ethiopia due to the slow pace of its 
adoption and the disruption between 2005 and 2007. SMS was not able to pick up after its 
reintroduction on the eve of the Ethiopian Millennium in September 2008. 
ETC’s revenue per employee has improved substantially, except for 2008 where the upward trend 
was disrupted due to more hiring during 2008. The number of ETC staff jumped by 5% in 2008 
while revenue rose only by 0.2% as shown in Figure 7. The improvement in revenue per employee 
does not necessarily mean productivity improvement. The ETC has yet to achieve the desired 
productivity of about one employee per 2000 subscribers needed to be regarded as a highly 
productive institution.
Figure 7. ETC Revenue Per Employee in USD
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008/2009
The ETC generates adequate positive cash flow which it reports on an annual basis. However, no 
cost audit has been made, based on modern communications accounting models, to suggest that 
the incumbent is actually profitable. The ETC has an accounting system that it uses for reporting its 
revenue minus expenditure, but it lacks a systematic cost/pricing regime for its investment and 
revenue and disaggregated figures for its different “profit centres” (fixed, mobile and Internet 
services). For example, it is not clear what it costs to run its Internet services and by what factor 
Internet is profitable over the mobile or fixed line segment or vice versa. 
Given the uncertainty of the telecommunications environment and the drop in revenue despite 
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Communications Network Coverage
The communication infrastructure in Ethiopia comprises a combination of satellite, optical fiber, 
microwave, multi access, UHF and VHF radios. Satellite has been a major communication medium 
for a long time. Ethiopia’s reliance on satellite has declined in recent years following the direct 
connection to Sudan and Djibouti and the construction of a significant national fibre backbone.
Fixed Line Coverage
Fixed-line coverage has seen growth from its lower base in 2003. Fixed-line telephone capacity has 
tripled, from 649,593 in 2003 to 1,769,024 in 2009. The percentage of digital lines to analogue has 
grown from 89.64% in 2003 to 99.87% in 2009. 
The increase in exchange capacity in recent years was mainly due to the introduction of the CDMA-
WLL service. Figure 8 shows that only about half of the circuits were in use by 2009.
Figure 8. Exchange Capacity and Subscriptionto Fixed Line
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008/2009
Fixed-line teledensity stands at 1.2%, which is very low compared to the global average of 18% in 
2009. It is far behind the planned 6% to be attained in 2010. In its 2008/2009 report the ETC offered 
a justification for its failure to meet its own fixed line targets by citing an ITU report that reported 
slow fixed-line growth around the world. While the slow growth of fixed lines is evident in many 
countries, the decline in mainlines was followed by a dramatic increase in mobile coverage and 
broadband access in other developing countries. The low mobile and broadband subscription in 
Ethiopia was unable to substitute for slow fixed-line development as in the case of other countries. 
Household subscribers represent three quarters of the fixed-line subscribers. The public, private and 
international institutions that represent about a quarter of the subscribers generate the bulk of 
ETC’s revenue. International organizations, such as NGOs and the United Nations account for about 
2% of the subscribers, while the business comprises 15.6% as shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9. Subscription Pattern of the Fixed Line
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Fixed Wireless Coverage
The introduction of a CDMA network in 2007 to reach 2.4 million subscribers has contributed to the 
availability of more fixed lines. There were 56,310 subscribers to the CDMA Wireless Local Loop 
network in 2009, representing about 6% of the total fixed telecommunications subscribers and 
2.5% of the envisaged CDMA subscribers target.
In addition, the ETC introduced pre-paid CDMA 1X and Evolution Data Optimizsd (EVDO) services 
to facilitate high speed Internet access for mobile users. The service attracted many users due to its 
pre-paid business model, high speed (compared to dial up) and the convenience of mobility. 
However, the deteriorating quality of service has begun to put off new subscribers in 2010.18  A 
typical CDMA 1X that operates at 256 Kbps has dropped to around 20 Kbps in March 2010, while an 
EVDO that originally operated at around 1 Mbps dropped to 100 Kbps, generating anger from 
those enjoying high quality broadband network service at the beginning.
Mobile Coverage
Notwithstanding recent improvements, mobile coverage is still very low in Ethiopia. The signal does 
not reach most rural areas except for the main roads fanning out from the capital Addis Ababa. A 
2008 GSM map shows that only the major towns, such as Bahir Dar, Dire Dawa, Dessie, Harar, 
Mekele, Nazreth and Nekempt were covered as shown in Figure 10.19
Figure 10. Mobile Geographic Coverage 2008
Source: GSM World - http://www.gsmworld.com/cgi-bin/ni_map.pl?cc=et&net=et
The switching capacity of the mobile network in 2001 was 4,808,248, of which 4,051,703 lines were 
subscribed. This implies that 84% of the total circuit has already been used. Mobile radio coverage 
and quality is generally uneven across the country, with the capital Addis Ababa the most 
connected, and some regions, such as Southern Nations and Nationalities People (SNNP) and 
Benshagul-Gumuz, barely connected with only about 1% population coverage. This has been a 
Towards Evidence-based ICT Policy and Regulation  
19
18 Personal Communication with CDMA and EVDO users
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significant barrier to universal access to voice and broadband communication. Table 10 shows 
network switching coverage as percentage of the population in different regions.
Table 10. Mobile Switching Coverage of Different Regions in 2009




Radio Network Capacity* Population % Coverage
1 Tigray 279,821 4,664,071 6
2 Afar 18,286 1,494,199 1
3 Amhara 651,242 18,167,982 4
4 Oromiya 869,515 29,737,371 3
5 Somali 79,531 4,713,619 2
6 Benishangul Gumuz 3,812 735,430 1
7 S.N.N.P 213,794 15,995,819 1
8 Gambella 6,746 358,511 2
9 Hareri 133,712 198,980 67
10 Addis Ababa 2,368,267 2,917,295 81
11 Dire Dawa 183,522 369,641 50







However, mobile subscription has been growing steadily and making up for the lack of adequate 
fixed lines access in Ethiopia (see Figure 11). The proportion of post-paid subscribers has declined in 
recent years, with the majority of the subscribers opting for pre-paid. Pre-paid subscribers account 
for 98.6% of total mobile subscribers.
Figure 11. Mobile Subscription
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008/2009
Mobile teledensity, which was 6% in 2009, is far from its planned ten million subscribers by 2010. 
Although current penetration remains high by local standards,20  it is very low when compared to 
progress in other countries. Ethiopia has trailed its neighbours by a large margin when it comes to 
mobile penetration. The number of SIM cards sold in Ethiopia is 10 times lower than in neigbouring 
countries such as Kenya and Sudan.
SIM cards are generally in short supply in areas outside of the capital. There have always been long 
queues to obtain SIM cards each time the ETC announces their availability. The upgrade of network 
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often takes a year, thus leading to a long list of customers waiting for SIM Cards. The fluctuation in 
the availability of SIM cards has a direct impact on mobile handset prices, which often jump by 50% 
when new SIM cards are available. 
Access to cheap handsets is another barrier to communications once the hurdle for SIM cards is 
overcome. The cheapest handset costs Birr 400 (US$30), which is beyond the reach of those at the 
Bottom of the Pyramid. The ETC, in collaboration with ZTE, has plans to build a US$5.2 million 
mobile handsets plant in Ethiopia, which is expected to bring the cost of handsets down and 
improve innovations around local languages.
National Backbone
Ethiopia has been building its fibre backbone. A national backbone fanning out from the capital 
Addis Ababa in seven directions has been under construction following the signing of a loan 
agreement with ZTE. The 10,000km fiber network connects 78 towns with a capacity of STM-1 (i.e. 
155 Mb/s), 46 towns with a capacity of STM-16 (i.e. 2.5 GB/s) and 9 towns with a capacity of 10 GB/s. 
A total of 113 towns out of the envisaged 500 have been connected to the optical fiber 
transmission link by the end of 2009. 
Figure 12 shows the route of the national backbone, which is expected to be completed by the end 
of 2010. Phase I of the network was completed in 2008 and phase II was completed by mid 2010. 
The ETC is implementing Phase III at the moment. 
Figure 12. A National Backbone Plan
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency, 2009
While the completion of the national backbone in three phases is expected to address the 
communications gaps throughout the country, the reliance on public financing and an external 
loan will create a major setback for further network expansion and maintenance. Fibre vandalism is 
beginning to emerge in remote parts of the country where limited protection is provided by local 
authorities. This does not only disrupt the critical national infrastructure but also poses quality of 
service challenges. 
The ETC has also been working towards improving its international bandwidth in recent years 
through a fibre link to Sudan. The current bandwidth stands at 897 Mbps, which breaks down into 
537 Mbps fiber links, a 342 Mbps satellite connection and an 18 Mbps microwave link via Djibouti, a 
very small pipe compared to the size of the economy, the demand and the population. The ETC 
intends to upgrade its international bandwidth to 4 Gbps following the signing of a US$47 million 
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agreement with SEACOM to purchase 20 STM-1 lines (3.1 Gbps) in March 2010 to meet the growing 
demand for international connectivity.
Internet Coverage
Internet coverage has been improving in recent years (see Figure 13). The number of subscribers 
has doubled in 2009 along with the introduction of mobile access using CDMA 1X and EVDO. There 
were 71,059 subscribers, which translates into 0.09% of the population. It is estimated that there are 
about 500,000 Internet users in Ethiopia in 2009, which implies that only 0.6% of the population has 
some form of Internet access. Ethiopia is way behind the world average Internet usage of 25.9%.
Figure 13. Internet Coverage
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008/2009
The diffusion of the Internet is partly hampered by the monopoly on its market that has elsewhere 
been liberalised. In August 2005, the government issued a directive that allows private companies 
to provide Internet service through the ETC’s infrastructure, but the regulations to implement 
Virtual Internet Service Provision (VISP) were not promulgated. Consequently, Internet services 
remained a monopoly of the incumbent, often resulting in frustratingly slow connections and 
sometimes complete disconnection from the global network altogether. 
Broadband Access
The number of broadband users is growing, although it did not pick up as in the case of other 
countries. There were 3498 broadband subscribers in 2009, a very low figure compared to the sheer 
size of institutions, SMEs and households that can afford access to high speed networks. The 
introduction of mobile broadband service in 2008 brought much relief for mobile consumers. The 
low quality of service and inadequate marketing means mobile broadband is still in its infancy, 
representing just around 0.005% – a very low figure when compared to a global average of 9.5%.
Broadcasting Coverage
The broadcasting sector has seen a dramatic improvement over the last two decades following the 
fall of the military regime that tightly controlled the sector. The print media has been liberalised and 
air-waves were freed for community and private FM radio stations. The government still controls 
television and long-range radio broadcasting. A number of regional governments, including 
Oromiya, the Tigray and Somali regions and Addis Ababa own their own radio and TV stations. 
There are about 2 million television sets and around 8 million radio sets in Ethiopia. This implies that 
about 12.5% of the households own TV sets and 50% of the households have access to radios in 
Ethiopia.
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Table 11. Distribution of TV and Radio Stations
Source: Ethiopian Broadcasting Agency – http://www.eba.gov.et/web/data/Broadcast/main.htm






















Oromiya TV Oromiya Radio
Oromoya 92.3 FM
Sheger 102.5 FM
Zami Radio FM 90.7 
Radio Fana radio
Radio Fana FM 98.1
Dimitsi Woyane Tigray
Afro FM 105.3
Dire TV Dire FM 106.1
Addis TV Addis FM 96.3









Broadcast licensing data from the Ethiopian Broadcasting Agency21  shows that diversity of 
language and coverage of radio and TV stations has improved significantly over the last decade. 
The Amharic, Oromifa, Tigirigna, Afar, Harari, Somali, English and French languages are covered by 
TV stations while over 20 local languages are broadcast over private, public and community radio 
stations. The Ethiopian Radio and Radio Fana are the most popular and widely available, with total 
geographic coverage over 80% of the country. In total about 90% of the country is covered by radio 
signal. Less than 10% of the country is covered by TV signal.
There are two pay-TV companies – GTV and Multi-choice – that broadcast premium programmes 
such as the popular English Premier League soccer. There are about 7500 subscribers to pay-TV, of 
whom 80% are in the capital Addis Ababa. In addition there are about 150,000 households that 
have access to Arab Sat, a “free” satellite broadcast to major news channels such as BBC, France 24 
and Aljazeera along with many national TV stations from the Middle East and Africa.
Notwithstanding the progress made in opening the airwaves for public and community 
broadcasters, Ethiopia has yet to build diverse, quality media. The number of private and 
community radio stations is insignificant compared to the size of the country and thirst for 
information. Radio stations are mainly concentrated in the capital and a few major towns. In 
addition there is a need for improved quality of broadcasting content. 
The government needs substantial resources to expand universal access to broadcasting and 
communication networks and to upgrade/maintain existing networks. A further massive loan is 
neither practical nor economically sustainable. Therefore there is a need for a carefully crafted policy 
that combines external loans with competition and public and private partnerships in order to 
sustain the building of next generation and converged networks and services.
Network Access Pricing
Communication Pricing Overview
Contrary to expectations, pricing for domestic fixed and mobile services remained very low in 
Ethiopia. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) price basket 
methodology, which uses data from dominant operators that have 50% market share, shows that 
Ethiopian mobile prices are relatively low compared to most countries in Africa. Of the 18 countries 
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that were surveyed by Research ICT Africa, only Ghana has a lower price than that of Ethiopia, as 
shown in Figure 15.
Figure 14. Mobile Tariff for Selected African Countries Using OECD Price Basket
Source: RIA (2010) African ICT Sector Performance Review 2009-2010
Similarly, ITU data for 2010 indicates that the fixed-line tariff is one of the lowest in Africa. In effect, 
the local call rate of US$0.02 compares with low tariff countries like Egypt and Tunisia.22  The data 
further shows in 2006 the price for 20 hours of Internet was US$14.64 – slightly higher than that of 
Tunisia (US$11.50) and Egypt (US$4.20) but still the lowest compared to the majority of African 
countries.
However, Ethiopian mobile, Internet and fixed prices should be seen in the context of the average 
income. Ethiopia’s GDP per capita in purchasing power parity is about US$900 – about seven times 
less than that of Egypt (US$6000) and nine times less than that of Tunisia (US$8200). The average 
income of a nurse and school teacher is Birr 1300 (US$100). 30 hours of Internet usage costs about 
15% of the average salary of a school teacher. Combined Internet and mobile usage would cost 
about a quarter of of the average income of a nurse or school teacher. Therefore the prices are not 
that low in real terms when compared to income and the growing inflation.
Fixed-line Pricing
The local call prices for fixed line have not changed for quite a long period. The government 
maintained a pro-poor and pro-rural policy that kept local and domestic long distance prices to a 
minimum. The fixed-line tariff comprises a one-time connection fee, monthly subscription fees and 
per minute call charges with slight differences between residential and business customers. Table 
12 shows a breakdown of charges, including connection fee, monthly fee and per-minute charges 
for fixed-line communications.
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Table 12.Fixed-line Call Tariffs












0.2 Birr for 6 minutes (US$0.015 for six 
minutes)
$3
International Tariff Africa, Asia, Europe, America Birr 11.5/min (US$0.9/min)
Calls to Djibouti Birr 8/minute ( $.6)
It is evident from Table 12 that the local fixed-line tariffs are relatively cheap when compared to 
other African countries and probably not cost-based. A six-minute local call costs about 0.2 Birr (US
$0.015). However, the story is rather different when one accesses telephones from privately-
operated “kiosk phones” scattered around the country that charge between 0.40 and 0.60 Birr per 
minute – almost twelve to fifteen times of the regular rate. With only 5025 public payphones in 
operation by September 2009, privately-operated “kiosk phones” enjoy more customers than public 
pay phones. Despite recent efforts to register and license public phone call providers, the majority 
of kiosk phones are not regulated. 
The domestic long-distance prices comprise two zones. Towns that belong to the same tariff zone 
pay less compared to calls between towns in different tariff zones. Calls within the same tariff zone 
cost Birr 0.4 (US$0.03) peak and Birr 0.25 (US$0.02) off-peak, while prices across tariff zones are Birr 
1.20 (US$0.09) peak and Birr 1.00 (US$0.8) off-peak. 
The international long-distance tariff was revised downward in 2003 and has not changed since. All 
international calls but those to Djibouti cost the equivalent of Birr 11.5 (US$0.9) per minute inclusive 
of tax, regardless of the continent. This is in contrast to previous pricing regime that divided 
international tariffs on the basis of continents – Africa, Asia, America and Europe. Calls to Djibouti 
cost Birr 8.05 (US$.6) inclusive of tax. 
The high international tariff is a subject of dissatisfaction with telephone users, as evidenced by the 
proliferation of “grey” market telephone use, even if this is deemed illegal. The high tariff is also 
responsible for the decline in outgoing calls as compared to incoming calls over the last ten years. 
The number of outgoing minutes remained constant over the last six years indicating that the high 
prices did not encourage more outgoing calls. Incoming calls have seen a steady growth over the 
time period as shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15. Incoming and Outgoing Calls
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008/2009
The ratio of incoming minutes to outgoing minutes was 3.8 in 2003 and jumped to 15 in 2009. This 
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about 4 in 2003. While the incoming calls are important for international settlement, the widening 
gap between outgoing and incoming minutes indicates traffic reversal due to high cost of 
communications. Most Ethiopians in the Diaspora are more likely to use cheap international calls to 
call their relatives than to ask them to call them from Ethiopia where the prices are exorbitantly 
high.
Mobile Pricing
Mobile to mobile call charges stand at about 0.83 Birr (US$0.06) per minute including tax – some of 
the lowest in the world. The mobile tariff structure emulates that of fixed-line tariffs; therefore no 
uniform national tariff is used as in other countries. The ETC divides mobile services in tariff zones – 
those who subscribe to numbers beginning with 910, 911, 912, 913, 916, 917 and 920 belong to the 
same tariff zone while those using numbers beginning with 914, 915 and 918 belong to another 
tariff zone. A call between 910 and 912 numbers costs 0.83 Birr (US$0.06) but a call from 910 
number to 914 costs twice as much – Birr 1.725 (US$0.12) inclusive of tax – even if the caller is 
sitting next to the recipient. The lack of uniform mobile tariffs is an absurd pricing scheme that did 
not take mobility and tariffs around the world into consideration. 
In addition, the ETC adds a compulsory charge of US$1.87 per month to maintain the mobile 
service. Those who could not pay within the specified period are disconnected and expected to 
pay US$2 for reconnection. Table 13 shows the mobile tariff as of December 2009. 
Table 13. Mobile Tariff as of December 2009
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Annual Statistical Bulletin 2008/2009
Prices
Post-Paid subscription Birr 414 (US$31)





Mobile to Mobile local peak
Birr 0.83 (US$0.06) per minute
Mobile to mobile within different tariff zones Birr 1.725 ($0.12)
Mobile to Mobile local off-peak (between 20:00 to 24:00_
Birr 0.345 ($0.03) per minute
Mobile to mobile within different tariff zones Birr 1.44 ($0.11)
Mobile to Mobile local tariff off-peak (between 24:00 -6:00)
Birr 0.196 (US$0.02) per minute
Mobile to mobile between different time zones Birr 0.83 (US$0.06)
Mobile to fixed line
0.83 Birr/minute (US$0.06 /minute] with same tariff zones
1.50 Birr/minute ($0.20/minute) between different tariff zones
International
Birr 11.5 ($0.9) per minute
The cost of the SIM card is another barrier to subscription to mobile services, particularly to those 
with low incomes. Although the cost of SIM cards has come down dramatically from US$42 in 2006 
to US$13 in 2009 and US$5 in 2010, the price is still high when compared to many African countries 
where SIM cards can be obtained for as little as US$2, or even for free as part of a subscription. 
The low level of economic development, lower mobile tariffs and absence of mobile value-added 
services such as the Short Messaging Service (SMS) means the incumbent was not able to derive 
the expected revenue from its mobile segment. An SMS costs about half of a voice call (i.e. $0.02 for 
local and US$0.5 for international message), a high price that had a negative impact on SMS uptake. 
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Internet Pricing
Internet pricing has undergone several revisions in 2002, 2006 and 2009 to encourage further 
usage. Prior to 2002, Internet pricing was based on five subscriber categories: individual home 
users, private businesses, international organisations, public institutions and local non-profit 
organisations. A fee structure that was based on volume of usage was introduced in 2002. At the 
time 30 hours (1800 minutes) of use was US$40. In 2006, the ETC revised the price downward, 
leading to a reduction of the set-up fee to US$20, a compulsory monthly usage charge of US$7 and 
volume use-based tariffs. The revision in 2006 brought the price of 30 hours Internet usage down 
by almost a half (US$26) from its value in 2002. Further downward revision took place in 2009, by 
which stage 30 minutes of Internet use cost US$14.
Table 14. Dialup Internet Pricing
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Company Profile 2006
Year Set up fee Monthly 
charge
Service Additional hours 30 hrs (Internet + 
telephone + tax)
2002 $38 $40
2006 $20 $7 - - $26
2009 $7.6 $3.1 600 min .10/min $14
The downward revision of Internet tariffs since 2006 has contributed to an increase in the number 
of subscribers. However, Internet revenue has seen a continuous decline, suggesting that the 
incumbent operator’s Internet business is the least profitable. Internet service provision requires 
considerable innovation and value add, which are grossly absent from the ETC offerings. The quality 
of Internet service has been declining since 2007, with increased usage of cyber cafés and public 
access in schools, universities, businesses and government institutions. The overall decline in quality 
of service is one of the factors that contributed to the plummeting of Internet Annual Revenue Per 
User as shown in Figure 16.
Figure 16. Annual Revenue Per User from the Internet Service
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation: Annual Statistical Bulletin
Figure 16 indicates that although the subscriber number grew eightfold between 2003 and 2009, 
the revenue per user declined threefold. 
On the other hand, the downward revision of tariffs and the availability of broadband access 
encouraged the proliferation of cyber cafés that resell dial-up access to occasional Internet users at 
reduced prices. Cyber cafés charge between Birr 0.40 to Birr 0.60 cents a minute. The per hour cyber 
café charges range between US$1.80 and US$3 an hour. 
Broadband Access Pricing
The ETC introduced DSL and Broadband Fixed Wireless Access (BFWA) services in 2005, followed by 
CDMA 1X and EVDO in 2008. The DSL and BFWA offerings were overpriced from the very 
beginning. 1 Mbps DSL access was about US$3000 per month in 2006. The broadband tariff was 
revised downwards in May 2009 where DSL prices were cut by 30% to 75% depending on the 
speed. The price of the 1 Mbps DSL connection was revised downwards by 75% to US$820 in 2009, 
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The CDMA 1X is charged on a per-minute basis, with a compulsory Birr 25 (US$1.8) charge every 
month and usage fee of Birr 0.10 (US$0.007) per minute up to 1300 minutes and Birr 0.07 a minute 
there after. EVDO, which is theoretically rated at about 700 Kbps and which in fact operates at the 
dialup rate, costs Birr 4049 (US$302) per month for unlimited usage inclusive of tax.
Table 15. Broadband Multimedia Service Tariffs
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, Corporate Profile 2006, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2008/2009
Speed Type of service
Inclusive of equipments installed for the customer 
Pre-service payment Monthly fee 
128 
Kbps
ADSL (2006) 869 361
ADSL (2009) 193 217
BFWA data only (2006) 1172 415
BFWA data only (2009) 421 257
BFWA data and voice (2006) 1803 867 
BFWA data and voice (2009) 893 341
256 
Kbps
ADSL (2006) 1600 700
ADSL (2009) 193 318
BFWA data only (2006) 1906 754
BFWA data only (2009) 421 358
BFWA data and voice (2006) 2538 867
BFWA data and voice (2009) 893 441
512 
Kbps
ADSL (2006) 3069 1380
ADSL (2009) 193 582
BFWA data only (2006) 3376 1434
BFWA data only (2009) 421 622
BFWA data and voice (2006) 4007 1546 
BFWA data and voice (2009) 893 706
1 Mbps
ADSL (2006) 6010 2740
ADSL (2009) 193 696
BFWA data only (2006) 6314 2794
BFWA data only (2009) 421 736
BFWA data and voice (2006) 7291 2905
BFWA data and voice (2009) 893 820
Ethiopia’s broadband prices are the highest in the region, possibly in the world, even with the 
downward revision of the tariffs in May 2009. A 1 Mbps DSL connection costs around US$82023  per 
month in Ethiopia, US$75 in Lesotho24  and around US$25 in the United States.25  ITU calculations 
indicate that average monthly subscription of broadband in Ethiopia is US$486.51,26  which 
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translates into $1,739.27 when adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity ,27  and is one of the highest 
tariffs in the world save for prices in the Central African Republic. 
The high broadband price has a determinant effect on the number of subscribers. The low quality 
of service is another factor that increased the cost of broadband services and consumer 
frustrations. Among the factors that have contributed to the declining quality of communication 
services were the: 
• Inability of the incumbent to meet the pent up demand. The growing demand for 
communications meant that the incumbent operator was forced to add subscribers to 
existing network without increasing the pipe. 
• Lack of adequate human resources – The ETC lacks adequate highly skilled workforce to 
address customer problems and shape traffic based on usage. 
• Limited understanding of consumer preference and challenges.
• Inadequate consumer education and sensitisation.
The completion of the ETC core network and connection to SEACOM is expected to ease the 
frustration of broadband customers. In the long term the regulator needs to enforce quality-of-
service standards and Service Level Agreements that will make the incumbent accountable for the 
fluctuation of its broadband services.
Broadcasting Pricing
There is no uniform pricing for broadcasting advertisement. The Ethiopian Radio and Television has 
a significant coverage and market share in broadcasting, followed by Radio Fana, which was able to 
market its services aggressively. The Ethiopian Television is supported by the government and 
advertising while Radio Fana operates on a commercial basis. There is a TV licence fee of Birr 50 (US
$4) annually but it has been difficult for the national broadcaster to collect the fees. 
Advertising rates vary considerably between 10,000 Birr (US$750) to 1,000 Birr (US$75) depending 
on the spot and time. There are reductions for non-Amharic languages such as Oromifa, Tigrigna, 
Afar and Somali. Non-commercial advertising is very cheap; often as low as US$3 a minute.
Interconnection Fee
The ETC operates a seamless communications network, therefore there is no requirement for 
interconnection fees between its mobile and fixed line services. There is no termination fee for 
fixed-mobile and mobile-mobile. Call rates between mobile and fixed are charged at the mobile-to-
mobile prices as shown in Table 16.
Table 16. Fixed and Mobile Connection Tariffs
Source: Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation,  Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2008/2009
Connection type
Local International
Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
Mobile to fixed 0.83 (US$0.06) 0.37 (US$0.03) 13.3 (US$0.9) 13.3 (US$.9)
Fixed to fixed 0.23 (US$0.017) 0.23 (US$0.017) 11.5 (US$0.8) 11.5 (US$0.8)
Mobile to mobile 0.83 (US$0.06) 0.37 (US$0.03) 13.3 (US$.9) 13.3 (US$.9)
The absence of termination fees means that the cost of communication was not increased due to 
interconnection charges. While local prices remain relatively low by global standards the 
international rates are the highest. The introduction of termination fees will likely lead to increased 
international call tariffs if the prices are not revised down. 
The pricing of mobile, fixed and broadband services shows that while local and domestic call tariffs 
are relatively low, international call tariffs and broadband prices are exorbitantly high and had a 
negative effect on revenue, subscriber numbers and network usage. The falling quality of service 
creates additional cost to consumers while curtailing overall national competitiveness. Regulatory 
innovations are required to address the cost and quality of service challenges in the 
communications sector.
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Telecommunications Regulatory Environment 
Perception in Ethiopia
The vertically integrated monopoly market structure in Ethiopia implies that regulatory 
interventions are very limited. The regulator’s job is mainly to look after the behaviour of the 
monopoly operator and small players at the lower end of the market such as equipment suppliers 
and resellers of Internet and mobile services.
Regulations in the area of interconnection and pricing are almost non-existent. The incumbent 
operates a seamless network that makes interconnection and termination charges unnecessary. 
The regulator does not set prices. It has limited power to impose a rebalanced tariff. Unbundling of 
the network elements were also unnecessary since there is no new entrant and competition. 
Mobile Virtual Network Operators that resell services and Voice Over the Internet Protocol (VOIP) are 
not allowed. 
Table 17. Telecommunications Regulatory Environment Dimensions and Situation in Ethiopia
Based on: Samarajiva et. al. (2005).
Dimension Scope Regulatory environment under 
monopoly setting
Market Entry
Transparency of licensing. Applicants 
should know the terms, conditions, 
criteria and length of time needed to 
reach a decision on their application. 
Monopoly market, communication 
license can only be issued to the 
incumbent operator. Others such as 
VSAT license can only be issued to 
international organisations with the 
consent of the minister on a case 
by case basis. 
Access to Scarce 
Resources
Timely, transparent and non-
discriminatory access to spectrum 
allocation, numbering and rights of 
way. 
Radio frequency spectrum has not 
been allocated except for a few FM 
radio stations that were licensed to 
operate. 
Interconnection
Interconnection with a major operator 
at a technically feasible point in the 
network. Interconnection should be 
offered promptly on a qualitative basis.
Absence of competition in both 
fixed and mobile markets means 
interconnection is not a major pre-
occupation 
Tariff Regulation Tariff regulation of charges to 
consumers






excessive prices, price discrimination 
and predatory pricing, refusal to deal 
and cross-subsidies.
Not applicable under a monopoly 
setting where there is no 
competition in the first place
Universal Access
Access to underserved areas, 
expanding access to ICTs, including 
the Internet, to rural areas
Universal access strategy is absent 
except for a rural infrastructure 
rollout plan by the incumbent 
operator
The Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency is responsible for the communication sector spectrum, 
while the Ethiopian Broadcasting Agency is responsible for allocation of the broadcast spectrum. 
The ETA did not come up with an elaborate spectrum plan due to monopoly over the existing 
spectrum by ETC. Ethiopia has neither spectrum policy nor guidelines for the usage of spectrum 
commons. The EBA undertook a study of the spectrum for the broadcasting sector in 2007 which is 
used as a basis for assigning frequencies to private and community radio broadcasters. 
The absence of expertise and regulation in the area of communication sector standards is self-
evident. There has been limited discussion about standards or adoption of a technology-neutral 
licensing framework. Type approval is limited to mobile handsets and some equipment imported 
by international institutions and individuals, often after these are seized by customs. The absence of 
a universal access policy and strategy also means that the regulator was unable to regulate 
universality, impose obligations on the operator or establish a universal access fund. In sum, the 
regulatory framework remained very weak with little ability to carrying out any considerable 
economic and technical regulation.
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Surveys of the Telecommunications Regulatory Environment (TRE) in 2006 and 2009 confirm the 
above scenario. The Telecommunications Regulatory Environment (TRE) measures the perception 
of key stakeholders of the actual regulatory situation – particularly of market entry by the private 
sector based on a methodology designed by Samarajiva et al (2005).28  The methodology asserts 
that having the regulator or regulatory document alone is not sufficient – it has to result in good 
performance. It argues that the perception of key stakeholders such as private sector and 
academics could provide a useful insight into the actual situation of the market and could enable 
the market to gauge regulatory performance. 
The TRE methodology has six dimensions: (i) market entry, (ii) access to scarce resources, (iii) 
interconnection, (iv) tariff regulation (v) anti-competitive practices regulation and (vi) universal 
access. Table 17 provides a summary of the dimensions and regulatory situation in Ethiopia.
A TRE survey in 2006 covered fifteen prominent respondents from private sector, academia and civil 
society. The 2006 result showed that market entry and the quality of service of the 
telecommunications sector are poor. The majority of respondents felt that access to scarce 
resources such as radio frequency spectrum and tariff regulations are not satisfactory. The anti-
competitive practice is poor since there is no competition in the telecommunications sector in the 
first place. Survey participants allowed that progress in rolling out telecommunications in rural 
areas has improved access to underserved areas, and therefore that progress towards universal 
access was satisfactory as shown in Figure 17.
Figure 17. TRE Result in 2006
A comparative analysis of the Telecommunications Regulatory Environment in 2006 with other 
African countries showed that Ethiopia scored the worst compared to 14 other nations except for 
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very weak, with little 




The 2006 TRE showed 
that the market entry 
and the quality of 
service of the 
telecommunications 
sector are poor.
Figure 18. TRE comparison with African countries in 2006
Source: Research ICT Africa (2010) African Telecommunications Sector Performance Review 2009-2010.
The 2009 TRE survey covered 47 prominent individuals from the private sector (equipment 
suppliers, operators, IT companies), academic and research institutions, the financial and banking 
sector, the media and the public sector. Results indicate that despite massive investment in the 
communication sector and an improvement in the number of subscribers, the perception of the 
regulatory environment has fallen sharply from 2006. It is likely that the hopes and enthusiasm for 
massive network rollout in 2006 have now dissipated with the falling quality of service.  A 
comparative analysis between perceptions in 2006 and 2009 shows a sharp decline in the overall 
perception of the Telecommunications Regulatory Environment (see Figure 19). 
Figure 19. Comparison of Telecommunication Regulatory Environment Perception in 2006 and 2009
Source: TRE Surveys, 2006 and 2009
Those surveyed indicated that the ICT market has become more anti-competitive and that market 
entry is becoming more difficult. There was also a general feeling that the quality of service has 
gotten worse. The only positive movement of perception is in the area of tariffs. This was partly due 
to revision of mobile SIM card and broadband tariffs between 2006 and 2009.
A comparative analysis of TRE in African countries shows that the regulatory environment in 
Ethiopia was the worst in the region in 2009 (see Figure 20). The TRE in Rwanda and Namibia has 
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The sharp decline in 
perception of the TRE 
in 2009 shows 
frustration with the 
quality of service and 
limited enthusiasm 
with the changes in 
the telecom sector.
Figure 20. Telecommunications Regulatory Environment of African Countries in 2009
Source: Research ICT Africa (2010) African Telecommunications Sector Performance Review.
The decline in the perception of the regulatory environment does not only indicate an 
understanding of the role of competition for development of the communications in Ethiopia by 
industry experts, academia and media but also shows a significant frustration about the low quality 
of service. Notwithstanding government investment in the ICT sector, the general perception is 
that efforts centred around the public sector were unable to bring the desired service quality, 
widespread access and affordability, in particular in the area of broadband services that underpin 
the development of a competitive ICT sector.
ICT Applications, Projects and Services
The ICT applications and services component has been growing over the last decade, spearheaded 
by high profile government projects that aim to connect schools, districts, health establishments, 
academic institutions and government offices. Table 18 lists some of the major government 
sponsored projects.
Table 18. Major Public Sector ICT Projects
Project name Achievements
Woredanet
Linking up 631 districts to a national data centre located in Addis Ababa. 
Woreda’s (districts) have access to Internet, telecommunication, video 
conference and databases at national level.
Schoolnet
Connection of 684 secondary schools including Technical and Vocational 
schools to the Internet and launching technology-mediated distance 
education.
Ethernet Connecting 13 public universities to a high-speed data network and the 
Internet.
Agri-net Connecting 49 agricultural research institutions.
Healthnet Linking up regional hospitals and introduction of telemedicine 
applications.
E-applications
Various bodies of the government such as the Ministry of Internal 
Revenue, National Statistical Agency, the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
and Ministry of Justice have implemented applications on tax registration, 
national accounts, business registration and legal management 
information systems.
The introduction of information and communication technologies to schools, districts and research 
centres has created a significant awareness of the role of ICTs in communication, information 
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The TRE 2009 showed 
that market entry 
became difficult and 
quality of service 
declined but a positive 
perception remained 




The TRE conclusion 
shows that desired 
service quality, 
widespread access and 
affordability, in 
particular in the area 
of broadband services, 
have not been 
achieved.
The introduction ICTs 
to schools, districts 
and research centres 
has created a 
significant awareness 





various projects including setting up community centres, establishing ICT parks and centres of 
excellence in ICT research and development, deploying a national e-government portal and 
establishing frameworks and standards for improving public sector connectivity.
On the other hand, the applications, research and development activities by the private sector have 
been insignificant, which is not surprising in an environment so non-conducive to innovation. 
Private sector initiatives were limited to systems development, networking, project implementation 
and hardware and software services. Other areas of enterprise activities include custom software 
development such as payroll systems, human resources management, hospital management, point 
of sale, online reservation, hotel booking and school management systems. 
The potential of the Internet and mobile technology was not tapped in Ethiopia due to the lack of a 
conducive environment for innovation. There are a few companies involved in web development, 
content management systems, and e-commerce solutions. Innovations around SMS technology 
were stalled following the disruption of the SMS service between 2005 and 2007. Mobile account 
access has been implemented by two private banks, but mobile banking did not take off due to 
limited awareness, lack of trust and an absence of the necessary legislation. Efforts to participate in 
Business Process Outsourcing by a few startup companies faced structural challenges including 
fluctuation of electricity, inadequacy of broadband network, lack of venture capital and more 
importantly availability of managerial and technical skills of a global standard. 
In summary, there is a significant discord between government efforts to improve access to health, 
education, trade and other public information and the environment necessary to enable it. The role 
of the private sector in developing applications that support farmers, health establishments, banks, 
schools and enterprises has been limited.
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The lack of highly 
skilled and experienced 
human resource 
capacity to deal with 
complex ICT networks, 
market, regulation and 
policy issues is the core 
challenge in Ethiopia.
Recommendations for Policy Actions 
The Ethiopian communications market has seen significant improvements, but this has been off a 
very low base. It still faces considerable challenges. The market is characterised by low-level service 
penetration compared to global averages, poor quality of service, excessive broadband and 
international call pricing that have a limiting effect on the revenue of the incumbent and 
competitiveness of enterprises, individuals and institutions. The inadequate skill in planning, 
designing, implementation and maintenance of communication networks and services, along with 
the absence of policy and regulatory capacity, is the underlying reason for Ethiopia’s falling behind 
the rest of the world. Public policies need to address these shortcomings to speed up the quest to 
become a knowledge and middle-income economy. 
Skilled Network and Policy Planners, Implementers and Troubleshooters 
One of the core challenges facing the Ethiopian ICT sector is the lack of highly skilled and 
experienced human resources  to deal with complex ICT networks, market, regulation and policy 
issues and to implement large socio-technical projects like Schoolnet, Woredanet and Ethernet. The 
recent introduction of PhD and Masters programmes in telecommunications and computer 
engineering is a good first step. Such an effort should be matched with building technical and 
hands-on expertise in designing, planning, implementation and troubleshooting networks and 
developing policies and regulation. Technical and policy capacity can only be developed through 
years of education, research and work experience, and it is hasty to assume that graduate education 
will create the necessary “equip” that will design the future of Ethiopia’s communications market. In 
the short term there is a need to:
• run a series of comprehensive courses on communications and broadcasting sector 
planning, policy and regulation for senior policy makers based on cases and experiences 
around the world;
• develop special and intensive hands-on certification-driven training on Internetworking 
technologies and Next Generation Networks for the core ETC staff; and
• build communications research capacity to facilitate research-driven decision making at all 
levels.
Improving Network Quality of Service 
The rapidly falling quality of services in the broadband and mobile markets has been detrimental to 
the revenue of the incumbent and the competitiveness of enterprise, institutions and individuals at 
all levels. While the completion of ETC’s core and access network and international connectivity are 
expected to improve the quality of service, it is important to devise other instruments that will 
redress the frustration of network users and enhance quality that help generate revenue lost to bad 
services. In the short term it is important to:
• build the capacity of the regulator in defining quality benchmarks, auditing QoS reports 
that are submitted by the incumbent;
• empower the regulator to apply the appropriate sanctions when the incumbent fails to 
meet those standards;
• implement Service Level Agreements and Customer Service Charters that will bind the 
incumbent to quality standards and make it accountable if the standards are not met; and
• put consumer protection frameworks in place, including complaint registration and 
resolution procedures
Regulatory Capacity Building
The capacity and legitimacy of the regulator is another important factor that will have a positive 
effect on sector growth. The weakness of the regulator was frequently cited as a major bottleneck 
to the liberalisation of the telecommunication sector in Ethiopia. However, it is difficult to build the 
capacity of a regulator when it is fully dependent on a government budget and falls under civil 
service remuneration. On the other hand, the introduction of competition will not be effective 
without regulatory capacity and a political will. Positive regulatory results can only occur when 
government begins to gradually introduce competition in the telecommunications sector. 
Towards Evidence-based ICT Policy and Regulation  
35
It is important to 
devise and implement 
instruments that will 
redress the frustration 
of network users and 
enhance quality that 
help generate revenue 
lost to bad services.
The ETA’s governance 
framework needs to 
change gradually, 
from being fully 
dependent on the 





Empowering the Ethiopian Telecommunications Agency is essential to ensuring a fair deal for 
consumers and for it to act as impartial referee among all the stakeholders. The empowerment 
process should involve:
• providing the ETA with a distinct legal mandate to issue regulations in the consumer 
interest;
• establishing an independent board of directors that steers development in the 
communications sector and guides the regulator;
• exempting the regulating agency from civil service salary rules that make it difficult to 
attract and retain well-qualified staff; and
• providing the ETA with a reliable source of financing its operations.
The ETA also needs to enhance its legitimacy and independence by improving its competence in 
telecommunications policy and regulation and regulating in the public interest while promoting 
innovation and profitability of operators. The creation of an ETA board/council drawn from 
government, civil society and the private sector would increase its legitimacy and independence. In 
order to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the consumers and investors, the ETA’s governance 
framework needs to change from being fully dependent on the government to an institution with 
independent commissioners or a board. It should be free from political pressure in its decisions to 
promote competition in the communication sector. It should have the legal and functional 
independence from network operators and service providers to assume the responsibility of 
facilitating market entry by new players, guarding against anticompetitive practices of the 
incumbent, and ensuring that the benefits of competition are passed on to consumers. 
The regulator needs to hire and retain highly qualified personnel. The gradual introduction of 
reform should go hand in hand with building human capacity in technical regulations that govern 
standards for equipment, radio spectrum usage and radio communication facilities, 
interconnection standards and other technical matters and social concerns including consumer 
protection, promoting universal service and affordable access. 
The government needs to consider merging various entities dealing with communications, such as 
EBA, EICTDA and ETA to benefit from economies of scale and promoting converged policy and 
regulation along with global trends. 
Increasing Revenue Per User 
The falling Annual Revenue Per User in mobile and Internet markets means the incumbent’s 
revenues will continue to plummet unless innovative products are put in place and quality of 
services improved. In order to improve the ARPU, the incumbent needs to:
• carry out in-depth market research on usage of its network in order to establish user 
preference choices; 
• introduce innovative products;
• enhance quality of service; and
• stimulate usage in reducing broadband and international fixed-line prices.
Gradual introduction of competition
Ethiopia’s competitiveness cannot be improved through the current vertically integrated market 
structure in the communication sector. Monopoly is neither desirable from the competitiveness 
individuals, firms and nations as a whole nor from the revenue that the government generates from 
the ICT sector. 
The experiences of neighbouring African countries shows that governments fare better when they 
introduce an environment for competition and innovation on a gradual basis. In Kenya for example, 
the combined government tax revenue from the operators is close to $1 billion. Sudatel is one of 
the most competitive operators in the African market. Nothing prevents Ethiopia from making 
similar progress over the next decade, if careful policy choices are made in the communication 
sector. In the short term the government needs to:
• carry out an assessment of local and international market and trends and design alternative 
policy regulatory choices;
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the communication 
sector.
• introduce competition in less profitable segment of ETC’s operations such as the Internet, 
web content and domain registration market;
• license a second mobile operator to bring the subscriber number in par with other African 
countries (from the current 4 million to 40 million users); and
• improve the efficiency of the incumbent.
• The above cannot be achieved without the appreciation by policy makers of the impact of 
an improved and competitive communications sector to the economy and the 
effectiveness of institutions, enterprises and individuals. It needs to make a commitment to 
move away from a vertically integrated ineffective market to an environment that brings 
quality, choice and innovations in this critical sector.
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